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Abstract
This paper empirically analyses airline pricing for short-haul ights in con-
texts with no credible threat of inter-modal competition. To this end, we explore
the southern Italian market since it is less accessible by other transport modes
and thus fares are the direct outcome of air-related competition. We show, in
fact, that market power matters, depending on the level of intra-modal compe-
tition, and that airlines apply di¤erentiated mark-ups. Besides, consistent with
the implementation of inter-temporal price discrimination (IPD), we nd a non-
monotonic inter-temporal prole of fares with a turning point included in the
interval of the 43th to 45th days before departure. Finally, we provide evidence
that in more competitive markets, airlines are more likely to engage in IPD.
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1 Introduction
There are three sources of competition in the airline market for short-haul ights which
jointly a¤ect fares. Airlines compete with other airlines for the same city-pair markets
(intra-modal competition). Moreover, airlines compete with other modes of transport
(inter-modal competition) such as trains, especially high speed trains, and cars, which
have the advantage of allowing travel at any time. Finally, airlines compete with
themselves by setting di¤erent fares in di¤erent time periods prior to departure. This
pricing strategy is known as inter-temporal price discrimination (IPD).
Past empirical contributions exploring pricing behaviour and competition in air
transportation were not able to control for the e¤ect of inter-modal competition which,
we can expect, a¤ected the results. This paper di¤ers from existing works as it attempts
to study airline pricing for short-haul ights in contexts with no credible threat of
inter-modal competition in order to shed light on pricing behaviour in response to the
pure air-related competition. To this end, we analyse a market, southern Italy, which
denitely shows a highly limited degree of inter-modal competition. For the connections
considered, in fact, services by alternative modes, including road transport, require, on
average, more than seven times the same travelling time as airline connections. Thus,
for these peripheral areas, air transport is often the only realistic alternative. We can
assume, therefore, that airline-pricing strategies are the straight result of air-related
competition. The pricing behaviour of airline companies also shows high variability of
fares per mile that unlikely can be justied by cost di¤erentials. The fare di¤erentials
might, instead, be considered as evidence of di¤erent degrees of market power with the
capacity to determine mark-ups.
In this paper, we address two issues. The rst is to measure the extent to which
intra-modal competition determines fares. The second is to shed light on the inter-
temporal prole of fares in order to verify whether airlines engage in IPD, and whether
IPD is of the monopolistic-type or the competitive-type. As for the former type, mar-
ket power is required to price discriminate as it enhances the ability of rms to set and
maintain higher mark-ups (Tirole, 1988). As for the latter type, market power is not
required to sustain price discrimination if consumers show heterogeneity of brand pref-
erences (Borenstein, 1985 and Holmes, 1989) or demand uncertainty about departure
time (Dana, 1998).
The dataset we use to address the research question is unique. It covers routes that
originate in southern Italy and that operated from November 2006 to February 2011.
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Data on fares were collected from airline websites to replicate consumer behaviour
when making reservations. Unlike previous contributions, we simulate the purchase
of round-trip fares instead of one-way fares. In this way, we e¤ectively replicate the
demand side since travellers more often purchase round-trip tickets rather than one-
way tickets. In addition, we precisely recreate the supply side as we can clearly see
if, for each round-trip ight, a carrier is a feasible alternative for travellers and is an
e¤ective competitor.
Our results on short-haul markets with no alternative modes of transport show that
when there is less intra-modal competition, airlines set higher fares since they exploit
the greater market power arising from a concentrated market structure. Specically,
a 10% increase of the market share allows carriers to post up to 6.4% higher fares.
Consistent with the implementation of IPD, we nd a non-monotonic prole of fares
- which can be roughly approximated by a J-curve - with a turning point included in
the interval of the 43th to 45th days before departure. We give new interpretations for
the non-monotonicity of faresinter-temporal prole, in addition to the existing ones.
Indeed, on the one hand, the non-monotonicity would be the evidence that airlines
exploit consumer-bounded rationality. Actually, a common wisdom among travellers
is, the later you buy, the more you pay for the ticketthus price-sensitive consumers
tend to buy in advance. Airlines, aware of this, can extract a greater surplus by setting
moderately higher fares for very-early purchasers who will buy the tickets believing
they are paying the cheapest fares. On the other hand, a higher fare for very-early
purchasers can be seen as a fee for risk-aversion. Indeed, risk-averse travellers usually
plan the trip well in advance as they would like to reduce travel uncertainty by making
the best choice in terms of departure day and time. Therefore, airlines, by posting
moderately higher fares at the very beginning, can extract an additional surplus from
risk-averse travellers. Finally, we provide evidence of a competitive-type IPD, as airlines
seem to be more likely to engage in IPD in more competitive markets.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we survey the relevant
literature. In Section 3 we present the empirical strategy and in Section 4 we give a
description of the data. In Section 5 we discuss the results and in Section 6 we draw
conclusions. The robustness check is provided in the Appendix.
3
2 Literature Review
The literature on which the current work is based concerns pricing in air transportation
and the factors inuencing it. We initially review papers that analyse the e¤ect of the
airline market structure on fares, then we focus on works looking at price discrimi-
nation and, in particular, at inter-temporal price discrimination (IPD). We conclude
the survey with contributions exploring the relationship between market structure and
price discrimination.
The rst to study the impact of market structure on fares was Borenstein (1989)
on the US airline industry. He develops a model using market share at both route and
airport level. Results indicate that market share, whatever measure adopted, inuences
the carriers ability to raise fares since the dominant presence of an airline at an airport
increases its market share on the routes included in that airport. However, Evans
and Kessides (1993) point out that, when controlling for inter-route heterogeneity,
market share on the route is no longer relevant in determining fares, that are, instead,
determined by carriersmarket share at the airports. More recently, some contributions
explore the European airline markets. Unlike the US market, Carlsson (2004) nds that
market power, measured by the Herndahl index, does not have a signicant e¤ect on
fares whereas it inuences ight frequencies. Consistent with this, Giaume and Guillou
(2004) nd a negative and, often, non-signicant impact of market concentration for
connections from Nice Airport (France) to European destinations. Bachis and Piga
(2007a) measure the e¤ect of market concentration at the origin airport on fares applied
by British carriers, considering either the route or the city-pair level. Their results
reveal the existence of a large degree of substitutability between the routes within a
city-pair. A greater market share at the route level leads to higher fares, while at city-
pair level it does not. Gaggero and Piga (2010) nd that a higher market share and the
Herndhal index at the city-pair level leads to higher fares on routes connecting the
Republic of Ireland to the UK. Finally, Brueckner et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive
analysis of competition and fares in domestic US markets, focussing on the roles of low-
cost carriers (LCCs) and full-service carriers (FSCs). They nd that FSC competition
in an airport-pair market has a limited e¤ect on fares, whilst competition in a city-
pair market has no e¤ect. In contrast, LCC competition has a strong impact on fares,
whether it occurs in airport-pair markets or in city-pair markets.
Concerning price discrimination, the main di¤erence between static and inter-
temporal price discrimination is that two di¤erent markets are covered in the former
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case, whereas the same market is periodically covered in the latter case. In a theoretical
model with two time periods, Logfren (1971) shows that, for the same good, a seller
applies higher prices to consumers with higher purchasing power in the rst period and
lower prices to consumers with lower purchasing power in the second period. Stokey
(1979) implicitly extends Logfrens framework to continuous periods. She claims that
IPD occurs when goods are "introduced on the market at a relatively high price, at
which time they are bought only by individuals who both value them very highly and
are very impatient. Over time, as the price declines, consumers to whom the product is
less valuable or who are less impatient make their purchases."1 In her paper, reference
is made to commodities such books, movies, computers and related programmes. The
concept, however, has had application to the airline industry where IPD consists of
setting di¤erent fares for di¤erent travellers according to how far in advance the ticket
is bought. However, in the airline industry, di¤erent from markets for commodities,
the inter-temporal prole of fares is increasing. Using IPD, airlines exploit travellers
varied willingness to pay and demand uncertainty about departure time. Price-inelastic
consumers, usually business travellers, most often purchase tickets close to departure
date, whilst price-elastic consumers, usually leisure travellers, tend to buy tickets in
advance. Travellersheterogeneity appears to be a necessary condition to successfully
implement price discrimination strategies. In a theoretical contribution, Alves and
Barbot (2009) illustrate that low-high pricing is a dominant strategy for LCCs only if
travellers, on a given route, show varied willingness to pay. Actually, Gale and Holmes
(1992, 1993) prove that, through advance-purchase discounts, a monopoly airline can
increase the output by smoothing consumersdemand with weak time preferences over
ight times and can extract the surplus of consumers with strong preferences. More re-
cently, Möller and Watanabe (2010) investigate further on advance-purchase discounts
versus clearance sales, showing that the former pricing strategy is preferred to the lat-
ter for airline tickets because their value is uncertain to buyers at the time of purchase,
and reselling is costly or di¢ cult to implement.
The inter-temporal prole of fares has been also empirically explored. McAfee and
te Velde (2006) nd out that one week before the departure there is a signicant rise
in fares, which is on the top of the rise of two weeks before the departure. Bachis
and Piga (2007a) show that fares posted by British LCCs follow an increasing inter-
temporal prole. Instead, Bachis and Piga (2007b), who examine UK connections to
1See page 355.
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and from Europe, and Alderighi and Piga (2010), who focus on Ryanair pricing in
the UK market, nd a U-shaped fare inter-temporal prole. Gaggero and Piga (2010)
show that fares for Ireland-UK connections follow a J-curve. Gaggero (2010) argues
that there are three categories of travellers: early-bookers and middle-bookers, usually
leisure travellers, and late-bookers, mostly business travellers. Early-bookers have a
slightly inelastic demand. Families planning holidays are, for instance, willing to pay
moderately higher fares to travel during vacations. Middle-bookers exhibit the highest
demand elasticity as they are more exible and search for the cheapest fares. Late-
bookers reveal an inelastic demand. A business traveller typically books the ticket a
few days before departure, with xed travel dates and destination. As a result, the fare
inter-temporal prole is J-shaped as it reects a pattern opposite to that of travellers
demand elasticity.2
One strand of literature explores the relationship between market structure and
price discrimination to nd out whether airlines are more willing to engage in price
discrimination strategies when markets are more or less competitive. Traditionally,
market power enhances the ability of rms to price discriminate. A monopolist can set
and maintain higher mark-ups.3 In the oligopolistic airline industry, when competition
increases, carriers lose this ability. Mark-ups associated with the fares paid by the
less price-sensitive (business) travellers decrease and align with the ones of the more
price-sensitive (leisure) travellers. However, Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) show
that market power is not required to sustain price discrimination if consumers show
heterogeneity of brand preferences. Business travellers prefer the long-run savings given
by loyalty programmes, whilst leisure travellers disregard carriers for short-run savings.
Sorting consumers based on strength of brand preference is a successful strategy, and
competition does not prevent rms from pursuing it. When competition increases,
the mark-ups applied to leisure travellers decrease, whereas the mark-ups applied to
business travellers remain almost unchanged. As a result, price discrimination increases
as competition increases. Further, Gale (1993) proves that competition to conquer less
time-sensitive travellers is stronger in an oligopoly than in a monopoly. Competition
reduces fares on the lower end of the distribution, thus enhancing price dispersion.
Finally, Dana (1998) shows that price discrimination, in the form of advance-purchase
2Abrate et al. (2010) show that in the hotel industry, hoteliers undertake IPD with two opposite
trends. If a room is booked for the working days, last minute prices are lower. Instead, if a room is
reserved for the weekend, last minute prices are higher.
3See Tirole (1988) Chapter 3.
6
discounts, does not require market power to be implemented. Consumers with more
certain demands are willing to buy in advance because the presence of consumers with
less certain demand could lead to an increase in prices.
Some empirical papers consider price dispersion as the result of price discrimina-
tion. Borenstein and Rose (1994) explore the US airline industry and provide evidence
of competitive-type price discrimination: lower price dispersion arises in more concen-
trated markets. Consistent with this, Carbonneau et al. (2004) show that more com-
petition is correlated with more price dispersion. Later, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)
revisit Borenstein and Roses (1994) analysis.4 They nd the same results when they
replicate Borenstein and Roses (1994) cross-sectional model. However, they have op-
posite results when performing a panel analysis. Indeed, they provide evidence of
monopolistic-type price discrimination: higher price dispersion arises in more concen-
trated markets.
Stavins (2001), instead, measures price discrimination through ticket restrictions.5
Consistent with Borenstein and Rose (1994), she provides evidence of competitive-type
price discrimination in the US airline industry: ticket restrictions reduce fares although
the e¤ect is lower for more concentrated markets. Using the cross-sectional model of
Stavins (2001), Giaume and Guillou (2004) get to the same results on intra-European
connections.6
Gaggero and Piga (2011) provide a seminal contribution on the e¤ect of market
structure on inter-temporal pricing-dispersion focussing on the routes connecting Ire-
land and the UK. Consistent with Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), they nd that few
companies with a relatively large market share can easily price discriminate.
In contrast to the aforementioned contributions, Hayes and Ross (1998) nd no em-
pirical evidence of price discrimination and market structure in the US airline industry.
Price dispersion is due to peak load pricing and it is inuenced by the characteristics of
the carriers operating on a given route. Consistent with this, Mantin and Koo (2009)
highlight that price dispersion is not a¤ected by the market structure. Instead, the
presence of LCCs among the competitors enhances dispersion by inducing FSCs to
4Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) explain that the panel approach allows them to estimate the e¤ect of
competition by accounting for changes in the competitive structure of a given route over time rather
than changes in competitive structures across routes.
5Ticket restrictions are the Saturday-night stay-over requirement and the advance-purchase re-
quirement.
6Besides the ticket restrictions used by Stavins (2001), Giaume and Guillou (2004) take into account
some exogenous segmentations such as families, age groups, student status, and events.
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adopt a more aggressive pricing behaviour.7
3 Empirical Strategy
We dene two models. The baseline model accounts for the e¤ect of market structure
and IPD on fares. The extended model allows for IPD to vary with market structure.8
The baseline model:
ln (Pit) = 0 + 1MarketStructurei + 2BookingDayt (1)
+3FlightCharacteristicsi + 4ControlDummiesit
+uit
the extended model:
ln (Pit) = 0 + 1MarketStructurei + 2BookingDayt (2)
+3 (MarketStructurei BookingDayt)
+4FlightCharacteristicsi + 5ControlDummiesit
+uit
where i indexes the round-trip ight and t indexes the time. Each ight i is dened
by the route, the carrier and the date of departure and return. We have a daily time
dimension that goes from 1 to 60.
The dependent variable is the log of the fares. The variable Booking Day captures
the e¤ect of IPD and ranges from 1 to 60. In order to account for the potential non-
linearity of Booking Day, we also add Booking Day squared to the model.
We use two indices of market structure at city-pair level:9
 Market Share, the average share of the daily ights operated by an airline at the
7Alderighi et al. (2004) nd that when an LCC enters a given route, the FSC incumbent reacts by
lowering both leisure and business fares. Further, Fageda et al. (2011) note that traditional carriers
are progressively adopting the management practices of LCCs. In particular, FSCs, through their
low-cost subsidiaries, are able to price more aggressively, and hence successfully compete with LCCs.
8The idea of measuring the net e¤ect of price discrimination from varying the market structure
has been inspired by the approach of Stavins (2001).
9We do not compute market structure variables at route-level because, working with a peripheral
area, almost all the carriers could operate as a monopolist on a given route. We need the city-pair
level to capture the real competition between carriers.
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two endpoints of a city-pair;10 and
 Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), based on Market Share.
Flight Characteristics includes the following variables:
 Holiday is a peak-period dummy equal to 1 for ights occurring during summer
holidays, winter holidays, bank holidays and public holidays, 0 otherwise;,and
 LCC is a carrier dummy equal to 1 for ights provided by LCCs, 0 otherwise.
Control dummies are:
 Route dummies to capture route-specic e¤ects, demand and cost (or price) dif-
ferences;
 Year dummies to account for macroeconomic factors equally a¤ecting all ights
in each year;
 Month dummies to capture seasonal e¤ects;
 Departure Time and Return Time, two sets of four categorical dummies captur-
ing the e¤ect of the takeo¤ time: Morning (6:00-10:00), Midday (10:00-14:00),
Afternoon (14:00-18:00) and Evening (18:00-24:00);11 and
 Stay dummies to control for the length of stay (i.e. howmany days elapse between
departure and return).
Finally, uit is the composite errore term, where uit = i+ "it. Specically, i is the
unobserved heterogeneity and "it is the idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are
clustered at ight level since observations on ights are not likely to be independent
over time.
10Market structure would be more appropriately calculated using revenue passenger-miles (RPM),
while we base our calculations on the amount of daily ights. This choice is due, basically, to data
constraint. At the moment, in fact, data on RPM are not available at ight-level for European
connections and, thus, the best proxy of market structure is based on data on the number of ight
provided, which are publicly available. For the same reason, a measure based on daily ights is used
also by Gaggero and Piga (2010, 2011).
11Based on Gaggero and Piga (2011).
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We want to estimate coe¢ cients of time-invariant variables, therefore we use the
Random E¤ects (RE) Generalised Least Square (GLS) estimator. The RE GLS esti-
mator to be consistent, requires the assumption that the right-hand side variables are
not correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity i. The Robust Hausman test using
the method of Wooldridge (2002) is performed after each regression to test the validity
of that assumption and, hence, the consistency of RE GLS estimates.12
We assume that the market structure is exogenous. Basically, we agree with Stavins
(2001), claiming that elements such as "entry barriers prevent new carriers from en-
tering city-pair routes (e.g., limited gate access, incumbent airlines hub-and-spoke
systems, and scale economies in network size)."13 Moreover, in the European Union
there are the "grandfather rights": an airline that held and used a slot last year is
entitled to do so again in the same season the following year. In the short run, then,
market structure can be assumed to be xed.
However, one might argue that capacity is always designed to accommodate planned
demand. Even in a slotted-constrained airport, if demand is clearly below capacity,
carriers adjust capacity and reallocate ights between routes. Therefore, even if the
overall airport capacity is xed, route-level capacity is not necessarily xed, even in
the short run. If this applies in our sample, Market Share and HHI are potentially cor-
related with "it. Therefore, we also employ the GMM estimator to obtain coe¢ cients.
We use instruments designed by Borenstein (1989) and largely adopted in the related
literature.14 Market Share is instrumented with GENP and Log(Distance), whilst HHI
is instrumented with QHHI and Log(Distance).
GENP is the observed carriers geometric mean of enplanements at the endpoints
divided by the sum across all carriers of the geometric mean of each carriers enplane-
ments at the endpoint airports:
GENP =
p
ENPk;1  ENPk;2Pp
ENPj;1  ENPj;2
(3)
where k is the observed airline and j refers to all airlines.
QHHI is the square of the market share tted value plus the rescaled sum of the
12See Wooldridge (2002), pp. 290-91
13Stavins follows the approach of Graham et al. (1983).
14See, for instance, Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), Gaggero and Piga
(2010). For a more detailed description of the instruments see Borenstein (1989) pp.351-353.
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squares of all other carriersshares:
QHHI = dMS + HHI  MS2
(1 MS)2

1 dMS2 (4)
whereMS stands for the Market Share and dMS is the tted value of MS from the
rst-stage regression.
Log(Distance) is the logarithm of the distance in kilometres between the two route
endpoints.
In the extended model we add the interaction between Booking Day and Mar-
ket Share or HHI. The interaction could be endogenous too, thus we include, as an
additional instrument, the interaction between Booking Day and GENP or QHHI,
respectively.
4 Data Collection
Data on fares were collected to replicate real travellersbehaviour when making reser-
vations. First, we identify plausible round-trips, then we retrieve data directly from
airlineswebsite by simulating reservations.15 We observe fares daily, starting generally
at sixty booking-days before departure. However, for some round-trip ights we have
less than sixty observed fares, thus the panel is unbalanced. We dene a dataset com-
prised of 19,605 observations on 427 round-trip ights from November 2006 to February
2011. Our sample includes 10 city-pairs (see Table 1) and 11 airline companies.
15We avoid any potential distortion on pricing strategies caused by online travel agencies that could
set discounted fares.
11
Table 1. List of city-pair markets
Origin Destination
Bari Milan
Bari Rome
Brindisi Milan
Brindisi Rome
Catania Milan
Catania Rome
Naples Milan
Naples Rome
Palermo Milan
Palermo Rome
We consider both FSCs and LCCs (see Table 2); thus we choose the basic services
(no add-ons) to make carrierssupply e¤ectively comparable.
Table 2. List of airline companies.
Full Service Carriers Low Cost Carriers
AirOne Alpieagles Meridiana Volare Web
Alitalia Blu Express MyAir WindJet
Lufthansa EasyJet Ryanair
We simulate the purchase of round-trip tickets, which gives us several advantages.
Firstly, we e¤ectively replicate the consumer behaviour since travellers mostly purchase
round-trip tickets rather than one-way tickets.16 In addition to that, we precisely
recreate the market structure as we can clearly see whether, for each round-trip ight,
a given carrier is a feasible alternative for travellers and an e¤ective competitor. The
use of round-trip fares also allows us to account for peak-periods and to verify whether
airlines adjust the pricing behaviour during phases of greater travel demand. Further,
one-way ticket pricing di¤ers depending on carrier type. For FSCs, a round-trip fare
is lower than the sum of the corresponding two one-way fares. This pricing policy
is not adopted by LCCs. To avoid distortions, previous contributions, using one-way
16See, for instance, the analysis on airline travel demand carried out by Belobaba (1987).
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fares, limit the empirical analysis to LCCs or to a few carriers. Instead, we do not
encounter this problem and we are able to carry out a market analysis and compare
pricing behaviour of all carrier types. In Table 3 we provide descriptive statistics.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Fares 19,605 153.80 84.85 11.92 690.49
Market Share 19,605 0.405 0.286 0.065 1
HHI 19,605 0.497 0.203 0.225 1
Booking Day 19,605 24.672 14.889 1 60
Holiday 19,605 0.458 0.498 0 1
LCC 19,605 0.455 0.498 0 1
Our data sample has a good deal of variation in terms of both fares and market
structure indices. In fact, we observe either monopolistic or more competitive markets.
Further, in Table 4, we report the average fares per mile posted by the incumbent
airline providing services for the city-pair included in the empirical analysis.
Table 4. Average round-trip fares per mile posted by the incumbent airline.17
Connection Avg fare per mile Connection Avg fare per mile
BRI-FCO-BRI 0.4260 PMO-LIN-PMO 0.1587
BRI-LIN-BRI 0.1832 PMO-MXP-PMO 0.1225
BRI-MXP-BRI 0.2387 CTA-FCO-CTA 0.2594
BDS-FCO-BDS 0.3086 CTA-MXP-CTA 0.1421
BDS-LIN-BDS 0.1588 NAP-FCO-NAP 0.8788
BDS-MXP-BDS 0.1332 NAP-LIN-NAP 0.1976
PMO-FCO-PMO 0.2548
From each origin, connections to Rome appear to be comparatively more expensive
than connections to Milan, even though point-to-point distances to Rome are shorter
than point-to-point distances to Milan. This could be only partially explained by the
17BRI = Bari; BDS = Brindisi; CTA = Catania; FCO = Roma Fiumicino; LIN = Milan Linate;
MXP = Milan Malpensa; NAP = Naples; PMO = Palermo. Data on the distance between the two
route endopoints are taken from the Word Airport Codes web site.
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cost of fuel. For short-haul ights, approximately 35% of fuel is used on the take-
o¤. Thus, the cost function is, strictly decreasing with distance. However, di¤erences
in fares do not seem to reect only di¤erences in costs, but, instead, would suggest
that the incumbent airline applies di¤erent mark-ups to di¤erent connections. This
preliminary evidence motivates an in-depth discussion on faresdeterminants.
It is worth looking at Figure 1 that shows that the relationship between average
posted fares and days prior to departure seems to be non-monotonic.
Figure 1. The intertemporal prole of fares. Figure 2. Density distribution of fares.
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Airlines set the initial level of fares, subject to slight changes for, roughly, fteen
days, and then fares sharply decrease to the minimum level. Henceforth, airlines in-
crease fares up to the departure day. The increment becomes steeper in the last fteen
days before departure. We look into this in depth when presenting regression results.
Figure 2 shows the density distribution of fares. The mass of values is concentrated
between 50 and 200 Euros.
5 Results
In each regression table we report both the results from RE GLS estimator and GMM
estimator.18 The results of the Robust Hausman test, which verify the assumption
validity of uncorrelation between right-hand side variables and the unobserved hetero-
geneity, do not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis, that the RE GLS estimator
18Current data on number of enplanements do not cover the whole sample of round-trip fares, so
GMM estimations are carried out on a smaller sample.
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is consistent.19 Concerning GMM estimations, we report the results of some tests.
The rst one concerns the non-weakness of instruments. For all the regressions, the
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic - the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald statistic - is far
greater than the critical value, therefore the null of the weakness of instruments is
strongly rejected.20 The second one is the Hansen J Test for the validity of the popu-
lation moment conditions. For all the regressions, we fail to reject the null hypothesis,
that the over-identifying restriction is valid, thus the instruments are not correlated
with the error term. Finally, the third one is the Exogeneity Test for market-structure
variables. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of either Market Share
or HHI for all the specications. GMM estimates are also very close to the RE GLS
estimates. This underlines the robustness of the results.
Estimation results reported in the tables contained in this section are organised
as follows: columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) report regressionsoutput using the variable
Market Share, whilst columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) report regressionsoutput using the
variable HHI.
Table 5 shows the results of the Baseline Model. Market Share and HHI have
a positive and highly signicant impact on fares. According to RE GLS estimates,
holding constant other variables, a 10% increase in Market Share leads to 6.4% higher
fares, and a 10% increase of HHI leads to 5.7% higher fares. Results are similar to
GMM estimates. Indeed, a 10% increase in Market Share results in 6.9% higher fares,
and a 10% increase of HHI results in 8% higher fares.
19We nd support for the use of the RE-GLS estimator for two main reasons. The RE GLS estimator
is inconsistent if regressors are correlated with individual-specic e¤ect, in our case the ight-specic
e¤ect. This is the omitted-variables problem one could try to solve by adding further regressors which
might be enough to make the xed e¤ect unnecessary. Actually, we include in the regressions a rich
set of control dummies that, given the Hausman tests results, are able to account for much of the
variance in the data. Then, the RE-GLS estimator corresponds to the FE estimator, and t goes to
innity. In our data sample, we observe each round-trip fare starting from 60 days before departure,
thus t = 60 might be fairly consistent as t is equal to innity.
20Critical values were computed by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the Cragg-Donald Statistic which
assumes i.i.d errors. Results need to be interpreted with caution only if the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Statistic is close to the critical values.
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Estimations are done, at rst, with only the variable Booking Day. Its coe¢ cient is
negative and signicant, meaning that airlines do engage in IPD. Indeed, fares posted
the day before appear to be 1.41% lower. We then include Booking Day squared to
the regression equation to check for the non-linearity, as the graphical investigation
suggests. The coe¢ cient of Booking Day squared is positive and highly signicant.
Booking Day has a negative e¤ect on fares until the turning point is reached. Beyond
that day, it has a positive impact on fares. In the non-linear case, the marginal e¤ect
of Booking Day on fares is dependent on the level of Booking Day: @ ln(Pit)
@Booking Dayt
=
 0:0353+2 (0:0004) Booking Dayt. We compute the marginal e¤ect for given values
of Booking Day which indicates how fares vary with respect to fares posted a day early.
Table 6. The marginal e¤ect () of Booking Day (BD) on fares.
BD  BD  BD  BD 
5 -0.0313*** 35 -0.0070*** 45 0.0011 51 0.0059***
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
10 -0.0273*** 40 -0.0030*** 46 0.0019** 52 0.0067***
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010)
15 -0.0233*** 41 -0.0022*** 47 0.0027*** 53 0.0075
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
20 -0.0192*** 42 -0.0014** 48 0.0035*** 54 0.0083***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011)
25 -0.0151*** 43 -0.0006 49 0.0043*** 55 0.0091***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011)
30 -0.0111*** 44 -0.0002 50 0.0051*** 60 0.0132***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011)
As shown in Table 6, from the 45th day before departure, fares posted a day before
are no longer cheaper. The marginal e¤ects are not statistically di¤erent from zero at
days 43th, 44th and 45th before departure, indicating, thus, that the minimum of the
J-curve occurs in the interval of 43th to 45th days.
The non-monotonicity of the fares inter-temporal prole has received various in-
terpretations in the literature. As stated earlier in the literature review, Gaggero
(2010) explains that the non-monotonicity is determined by travellersdemand elastic-
ity. Indeed, he identies three categories of travellers with di¤erent demand elasticity
17
and purchase timing. Early-bookers have a slightly inelastic demand. For instance,
families are willing to pay moderately higher fares to travel during vacations. Middle-
bookers exhibit the highest demand elasticity as they are more exible and search for
the cheapest fares looking at di¤erent holiday destinations. Late-bookers reveal an
inelastic demand, such as the business traveller typically booking the ticket a few days
before departure, with xed travel dates and destination. Instead, Bilotkach et al.
(2012) claim that fare-drops occur when the actual demand is below the expectation.
Therefore, airlines might periodically reduce fares in order to respond to the need of
raising the load factor.
Although we share the previous arguments, we propose two new interpretations.
We think, in fact, that the J-shaped fare distribution might also be generated by other
factors. Travellers generally believe that they can save money by buying in advance.
Therefore, setting moderately higher fares for very-early purchasers seems to be a good
pricing strategy for airlines since travellers will buy the tickets anyway, believing to be
paying the cheapest fare. With this line of reasoning, the non-monotonicity might be
seen as the result of consumer-bounded rationality.
Furthermore, travellers are also heterogeneous in terms of risk-aversion. There are
risk-averse travellers who do strongly prefer to plan the trip well in advance in order
to make the best choice in terms of departure day and time, thus reducing the overall
travel uncertainty. Therefore, higher fares at the very beginning of the inter-temporal
distribution might be considered as a fee for risk-averse travellers from whom the airline
can obtain an additional surplus.
Coe¢ cients of the control variables are those one might expect. The coe¢ cient of
Holiday is positive and signicant. During peak-periods, airlines exploit the greater
travel demand and set 21% to 24% higher fares than o¤-peak periods. The LLCs
coe¢ cient is negative and signicant.21
In regressions with Market Share, LCCs appear to price 23% lower than FSCs,
whilst in regressions with HHI as the predictor, LCCs appear to price 41% lower than
FSCs. The di¤erent impact is due to the coexistence of Market Share and LCC in the
same regressions. Actually, Market Share takes lower values when a carrier is a low
cost one, thus it already captures the e¤ect on fares induced by LCC.
Table 7 shows the results of the Extended Model I. Booking Day is still negative and
signicant, while its interaction with Market Share or HHI is positive and signicant.
21This is in line with Bergantino (2009). She highlights that LCCs post half the fares of FSCs on
some Italian connection at small airports.
18
The negative impact of Booking Day reduces in less competitive markets, therefore
competition does not prevent airlines from using IPD strategies.
19
T
ab
le
7.
E
xt
en
de
d
M
od
el
I.
R
E
-G
L
S
E
st
im
at
es
G
M
M
E
st
im
at
es
M
ar
ke
t
S
ha
re
H
H
I
M
ar
ke
t
S
ha
re
H
H
I
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
M
ar
ke
t
S
tr
uc
tu
re
0.
00
49
**
*
0.
00
51
**
*
0.
00
43
**
*
0.
00
47
**
*
0.
00
55
**
*
0.
00
57
**
*
0.
00
67
**
*
0.
00
68
**
*
(0
.0
01
0)
(0
.0
01
0)
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
01
4)
(0
.0
01
3)
(0
.0
01
3)
(0
.0
01
3)
B
oo
ki
n
g
D
ay
-0
.0
16
6*
**
-0
.0
37
5*
**
-0
.0
17
1*
**
-0
.0
37
4*
**
-0
.0
15
9*
**
-0
.0
35
0*
**
-0
.0
16
1*
**
-0
.0
35
4*
**
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
01
5)
(0
.0
01
3)
(0
.0
01
6)
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
01
6)
(0
.0
01
4)
(0
.0
01
8)
B
oo
ki
n
g
D
ay
2
0.
00
04
**
*
0.
00
04
**
*
0.
00
04
**
*
0.
00
04
**
*
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
M
ar
ke
t
S
tr
uc
tu
re
*B
oo
ki
n
g
D
ay
0.
00
01
**
*
0.
00
01
**
*
0.
00
01
**
0.
00
00
**
0.
00
01
**
0.
00
00
**
0.
00
00
*
0.
00
00
*
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
H
ol
id
ay
s
0.
20
88
**
*
0.
21
18
**
*
0.
23
21
**
*
0.
23
48
**
*
0.
18
42
**
*
0.
18
88
**
*
0.
19
95
**
*
0.
20
45
**
*
(0
.0
52
1)
(0
.0
52
2)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
59
7)
(0
.0
59
8)
(0
.0
62
4)
(0
.0
62
4)
L
C
C
-0
.2
26
3*
**
-0
.2
27
1*
**
-0
.4
04
9*
**
-0
.4
06
0*
**
-0
.2
47
2*
**
-0
.2
45
2*
**
-0
.4
27
8*
**
-0
.4
28
3*
**
(0
.0
42
4)
(0
.0
42
4)
(0
.0
32
4)
(0
.0
32
5)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
37
3)
(0
.0
37
4)
H
au
sm
an
T
es
t
St
at
is
ti
c
0.
94
2
2.
32
5
0.
10
9
1.
70
9
H
au
sm
an
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
0.
62
4
0.
50
8
0.
94
7
0.
63
5
K
le
ib
er
ge
n-
P
aa
p
St
at
is
ti
c
76
.8
0
76
.8
2
23
3.
8
23
3.
9
H
an
se
n
J
T
es
t
St
at
is
ti
c
0.
06
2
0.
05
3
0.
04
3
0.
03
5
H
an
se
n
J
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
0.
80
3
0.
81
9
0.
83
5
0.
85
2
E
nd
og
en
ei
ty
T
es
t
St
at
is
ti
c
0.
65
8
1.
06
4
3.
64
4
2.
81
0
E
nd
og
en
ei
ty
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
0.
72
0
0.
58
7
0.
16
2
0.
24
5
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
19
,6
05
19
,6
05
19
,6
05
19
,6
05
16
,4
76
16
,4
76
16
,4
76
16
,4
76
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(i
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s)
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
i
gh
t
le
ve
l.
C
on
tr
ol
du
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
al
w
ay
s
in
cl
ud
ed
bu
t
no
t
re
p
or
te
d.
St
oc
k-
Y
og
o
(2
00
5)
cr
it
ic
al
va
lu
e
is
14
.4
3.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1.
20
The marginal e¤ect of Booking Day is now given by: @ ln(Pit)
@Booking Day
=  0:0375 +
2  (0:0004) Booking Dayt   (0:0001)Market Sharei or @ ln(Pit)@Booking Day =  0:0374 +
2  (0:0004) Booking Dayt   (0:00004) HHIi. In Table 8, we report the marginal
e¤ects for values of Booking Day, setting Market Share and HHI equal to the sample
mean. We compare these results with those obtained from the baseline regression (no
interaction).The marginal e¤ect of Booking Day is now given by In Table 8 we report
the partial e¤ects for values of Booking Day setting Market Share and HHI equal to
the sample mean. We compare these results with those obtained from the baseline
regression (no interaction).
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Table 8. The marginal e¤ect of Booking Day (BD) on fares by a
1% increase of Market Share/HHI
BD  (no interaction)  (Market Share)  (HHI)
5 -0.0313*** -0.0311*** -0.0311***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
10 -0.0273*** -0.0271*** -0.0271***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
15 -0.0233*** -0.0231*** -0.0231***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
20 -0.0192*** -0.0191*** -0.0191***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
25 -0.0151*** -0.0151*** -0.0151***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
30 -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0111***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
35 -0.0070*** -0.0070*** -0.0071***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
40 -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
45 0.0011 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007)
50 0.0051*** 0.0050*** 0.0049***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
55 0.0091*** 0.0090*** 0.0089***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
60 0.0132*** 0.0130*** 0.0129***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013)
In less competitive city-pair markets, the J-curve appears to be attened. Di¤er-
ences between fares posted on di¤erent booking days are less pronounced. This nding
is in favour of competitive-type price discrimination, in line with Borestein and Rose
(1994), Stavins (2001) and Giaume and Guillou (2004), and in contrast to Gerardi and
Shapiro (2007) and Gaggero and Piga (2011).
Table 9 illustrates the results of the Extended Model II by which we investigate
IPD further. We test whether airlines adjust their pricing behaviour during phases of a
22
greater travel demand. To this end, we add to the regression equation, the interaction
between Booking Day and Holiday, which has a positive and signicant impact on
fares. The e¤ect of Booking Day on fares for peak periods is 0.56% to 0.64% lower
than for o¤-peak periods. Basically this is due to two facts. One the one hand, the
greater travel demand allows airlines to decrease IPD because they can sell all the
seats with no need of discounted fares. On the other hand, during holidays, travellers
are more homogeneous, as people journey mainly for tourism. IPD, being based on
the heterogeneity of travellers, becomes less e¤ective. Furthermore, we focus on IPD
strategies implemented by LCCs. To this end we employ the interaction between the
Booking Day and LCC, which has a negative impact on fares. The e¤ect of Booking
Day on posted fares is 0.34% to 0.42% higher for LCCs than FSCs. LCCs engage in a
stronger IPD, in line with the more aggressive pricing behaviour of LCCs.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper explores pricing in air transportation for short-haul markets, removing the
inuence of inter-modal competition. To that end, we use a unique dataset on the
southern Italian market that exhibits limited inter-modal competition, thus airline
pricing strategies are the straight results of air-related competition.
Basically, we explore two issues. The rst is to measure the extent to which intra-
modal competition determines fares. The second is to shed light on the inter-temporal
prole of fares to verify whether airlines engage in IPD and whether IPD is of a
monopolistic-type or a competitive-type. Results are robust across regressions. Fur-
ther, the robust Hausman test shows that the RE GLS estimator provides consistent
estimates.
We nd that airlines exploit their dominant position on a city-pair market. When
the intra-modal competition reduces, airlines post higher fares. Indeed, a 10% increase
in Market Share leads to 6.4% higher fares, and a 10% increase of HHI leads to 5.7%
higher fares. Further, we show that airlines do undertake IPD and that the fare inter-
temporal prole appears to be non-monotonic, resembling a J-curve with a turning
point included in the interval of the 43th to 45th days before departure. In addition to
the existing interpretation on the non-monotonicity of fares inter-temporal prole, we
set forward two new possible views. On the one hand, the non-monotonicity would be
the evidence that airlines exploit consumer-bounded rationality. Travellers generally
believe that the later the ticket is bought, the more it costs and, thus price sensitive
consumers tend to buy in advance. Thus, airlines can, extract a greater surplus by set-
ting moderately higher fares for very-early purchasers who will buy the tickets believing
to pay the cheapest fares. On the other hand, a higher fare for very-early purchasers
can be interpreted as a fee for risk-aversion. Airlines can extract additional surplus
from risk-averse travellers by posting moderately higher fares at the very beginning of
the selling schedule.
The empirical evidence is in favour of competitive-type price discrimination: a more
competitive market structure fosters the implementation of IPD. Basically, in less com-
petitive city-pair markets, the J-curve appears to be attened. Finally, airline pricing
strategies di¤er depending on carrier type. LCCs seem to adopt a more aggressive
pricing behaviour as, on average, they set lower fares and undertake stronger IPD
strategies.
One might say that price discrimination is only benecial for airlines. However,
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in more competitive markets, airlines charge lower fares that, together with the IPD,
allow them to target larger segments of demand, which leads to a "democratisation"
of air travel. This is very important for areas as southern Italy where the inter-modal
competition is limited.
Developments for future research could be an enlargement of the territorial coverage
in order to compare di¤erent exogenously determined accessibility conditions and, thus,
to measure the impact of air-related competition on accessibility. Moreover, it would be
interesting to analyse the impact of local government subsidies often granted to low-
cost airlines through co-marketing programmes on fares and pricing strategies, thus
analysing the net welfare of the area in question.
26
References
[1] Abrate, G., Fraquelli, G., Viglia, G. (2010). Dynamic pricing strategies and cus-
tomer heterogeneity: the case of European hotels. HERMESWorking Paper, 10-7.
[2] Alderighi, M., Cento, A., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (2004). The Entry of Low-Cost
Airlines: Price Competition in the European Airline Market. Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper, 04-074/3.
[3] Alderighi, M., Piga, C.A. (2010). On-line Booking and Revenue Management:
Evidence from a Low-Cost Airline. Review of Economic Analysis, 2(3): 272-286.
[4] Alves, C.F., Barbot, C. (2009). Price Discrimination Strategies of Low-Cost Car-
riers. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 43(3): 345-363.
[5] Bachis, E., Piga, C.A. (2007a). Hub Premium, Airport Dominance and Market
Power in the European Airline Industry. Discussion Paper Series 2007_11, De-
partment of Economics, Loughborough University.
[6] Bachis, E., Piga, C.A. (2007b). Pricing strategies by European traditional and low
cost airlines. Or, when is it the best time to book on line?. in Darin Lee (ed.),
Advances in Airline Economics, Volume 2: The Economics of Airline Institutions,
Operations and Marketing, Elsevier: Amsterdam, ch. 10, 319-344.
[7] Belobaba, P. P. (1987). Air travel demand and airline seat inventory management.
Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7. Cambridge, MA: The Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology.
[8] Bilotkach, V., Gaggero, A.A., Piga, C.A. (2012). Airline Pricing under Di¤erent
Market Conditions: Evidence from European Low-Cost Carriers. Discussion Paper
Series 2012_01, Department of Economics, Loughborough University.
[9] Bergantino, A.S. (2009). Le strategie di prezzo delle compagnie tradizionali e
delle low cost. Implicazioni per i sistemi aeroportuali minori: il caso della Puglia.
Trasporti, ambiente e territorio. La ricerca di un nuovo equilibrio, Franco Angeli,
Milano, 77-91.
[10] Borenstein, S. (1985). Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 16(3) 380-397.
27
[11] Borenstein, S. (1989). Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, 20(3): 344-365.
[12] Borenstein, S., Rose, N.L. (1994). Competition and price dispersion in the US
airline industry. The Journal of Political Economy, 102(4): 653-683.
[13] Brueckner, J.K., Lee, D., Singer, E.S. (2013). Airline competition and domestic US
airfares: A comprehensive reappraisal. Economics of Transportation, 2(1): 1-17.
[14] Carlsson, F. (2004). Prices and Departures in European Domestic Aviation Mar-
kets. Review of Industrial Organization: 24(1): 37-49.
[15] Carbonneau, S., McAfee, R.P., Mialon, H., Mialon, S. (2004). Price Discrimi-
nation and Market Power. Emory Economics 0413, Department of Economics,
Emory University (Atlanta)
[16] Dana, J.D. (1998). Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Com-
petitive Markets. The Journal of Political Economy, 106(2): 395-422.
[17] Evans, W.N., Kessides, J.N. (1993). Localised Market Power in the U.S. Airline
Industry. Review of Economics & Statistics, 75(1): 66-75.
[18] Fageda, X., Jiménez, J.L., Perdiguero, J. (2011). Price rivalry in airline markets:
a study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-cost carrier.
Journal of Transport Geography, 19(4): 658-669.
[19] Gaggero, A.A. (2010). Airline Pricing and Competition: the J-curve of airline
fares. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.
[20] Gaggero, A.A., Piga, C.A. (2010). Airline competition in the British Isles. Trans-
portation Research Part E, 46(2): 270-279.
[21] Gaggero, A.A., Piga, C.A. (2011). Airline Market Power and Intertemporal Price
Dispersion. Journal of Industrial Economics, 59(4): 552-577.
[22] Gale, I.L. (1993). Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance-Purchases. Review
of Industrial Organization, 8(4): 451-464.
[23] Gale, I.L., Holmes, T.J. (1992). The e¢ ciency of advance-purchase discounts in
the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 10(3): 413-437.
28
[24] Gale, I.L., Holmes, T.J. (1993). Advance-Purchase Discounts and Monopoly Al-
location of Capacity. American Economic Review, 83(1): 135-146.
[25] Gerardi, K., Shapiro A. (2009). Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New
Evidence From the Airline Industry. Journal of Political Economy, 117(1): 1-37.
[26] Giaume, S., Guillou, S. (2004). Price discrimination and concentration in Euro-
pean airline markets. Journal of Air Transport Management, 10(5): 305-310.
[27] Graham, D. R., Kaplan D. P., Sibley D. S. (1983). E¢ ciency and Competition in
the Airline Industry. Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1): 118-138.
[28] Hayes, K., Ross, L. (1998). Is Airline Price Dispersion the Result of Careful Plan-
ning or Competitive Forces? Review of Industrial Organization, 13(5): 523-542.
[29] Holmes, T. (1989). The E¤ects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly.
American Economic Review, 79(1): 244-250.
[30] Lofgren, K.G. (1971). The theory of intertemporal price discrimination. An out-
line. Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(3): 333-343.
[31] Mantin, B., Koo, B. (2009). Dynamic price dispersion in airline market. Trans-
portation Research Part E, 45(6): 1020-1029.
[32] Möller, M. and Watanabe, M. (2010). Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clear-
ance Sales. The Economic Journal, 120(549): 1125-1148.
[33] McAfee R.P., te Velde, V. (2006). Dynamic Pricing in the Airline industry. Hand-
book on Economics and Information Systems, Ed: T.J. Hendershott, Elsevier,
Handbooks in Information Systems, Volume I.
[34] Stavins, J. (2001). Price Discrimination in the Airline Market: The E¤ect of
Market Concentration. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1): 200-202.
[35] Stock, J.H., Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in IV Regression.
Identication and Inference for Econometric Models: A Festschrift in Honor of
Thomas Rothenberg, DonaldW.K.A., Stock, J.H. eds. Cambridge University Press,
80-108.
29
[36] Stokey, N. (1979). Intertemporal price discrimination. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 93(3): 355-371.
[37] Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
[38] Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
30
Appendix A
We have distinguished between carriers of two types: FSCs and LCCs. Indeed, we have
assumed similar operating characteristics and pricing behaviour within types. For the
robustness check we verify whether the results hold when a more detailed distinction
is made and carrier dummies are added to the model. As shown in Table 10, estimates
do not change when we make more specic hypotheses about the behaviour of each
carrier.
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